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The European Parliament referred the following motions for resolutions to 
the Political Affairs Committee pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure: 
- at its sitting of 12 January 1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by 
Mr MARSHALL and others on political rights in Zimbabwe (Doc. 1-1064/82), 
- at its sitting of 7 February 1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by 
Mr Gerard FUCHS on the threats of destabilization in Zimbabwe (Doc. 1-1151/82>, 
referred to the Committee on Development and Cooperation for its opinion. 
At its meeting of 22-24 February 1983, the Political Affairs Committee 
decided to draw up a report. 
The committee appointed Sir James SCOTT HOPKINS rapporteur at its meeting 
of 28 September 1983. 
The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 23-25 November 
1983 and 28 February - 1 March 1984. 
At the Last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr HAAGERUP, acting chairman and 
first vice-chairman; Mr FERGUSSON, third vice-chairman; Sir James SCOTT-HOPKINS, 
rapporteur; Mr ANTONIOZZI, Mr CARIGLIA, Mr CROUX (deputizing for Mr DESCHAMPS), 
Lady ELLES, Mr EPHREMIDIS, Mr FELLERMAIER (deputizing for Mr B. FRIEDRICH), 
Mr GEROKOSTOPOULOS (deputizing for Mr SCHALL), Mr HABSBURG, Mr von HASSEL, Mrs van 
den HEUVEL, Mr ISRAEL (deputizing for Mr de La MALENE>, Mr KLEPSCH, Mrs LENZ, 
Mr MOMMERSTEEG (deputizing for Mr BOURNIAS), Mr MOORHOUSE (deputizing for Lord 
BETHELL), Mr NORMANTON (deputizing for Lord O'HAGAN), Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr PENDERS, 
Mr RIPA DI MEANA (deputizing for Mr JAQUET), Mrs SCRIVENER (deputizing for 
Mr DONNEZ), Mr SEITLINGER (deputizing for Mr RUMOR), Mr SIMONNET (deputizing for 
Mr BARB!), Mr VAN MIERT and Mr ZAGAR!. 
The opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation is attached 
to this report. 
The report was tabled on 2 March 1984. 
The deadline for the tabling of amendments to this report will be indicated 
on the draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated. 
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A 
The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following Motion for a resolution, together with Explanatory Statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe 
The European Parliament, 
1 
- Having regard to its resolutions on Southern Africa of 9 February 1983 , and 
on human rights in Zimbabwe of 17 November 19832, 
- Having regard to the following motions for resolution: 
-motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Marshall and others on political rights 
in Zimbabwe (Doc. 1-1064/82), 
motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Fuchs on threats of destabilization in 
Zimbabwe (Doc. 1-1151/82), 
-Having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee and the opinion 
of the Committee on Development and Cooperation <Doc. 1-1529/83>, 
A. Having regard to the close links Zimbabwe has had with Europe and especially 
with the United Kingdom, 
B. Having regard to the importance of Zimbabwe in Southern Africa and also in 
the development of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC), 
C. Having regard to the fact that the first act of independent Zimbabwe was to 
apply for membership of the ACP and EEC Convention, 
D. Recognizing the difficult task facing the government of Zimbabwe in securing 
peace and stability after 15 years of civil war, 
E. Having regard for the need to respect the safeguards in the Zimbabwe consti-
tution for the rights of all minority groups in Zimbabwe, 
F. Having regard to violations of human rights particularly in Matabeleland, 
G. Having regard to the ambivalent attitude of the government of South Africa to 
the development of a multi-racial democracy in Zimbabwe, 
1 OJ No. C 68, 14.3.83, page 42 
2 OJ No. C 342, 19.12.83, page 56 
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H. Having regard to the importance oftrade and communication Lin~ between 
Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa, 
1. Affirms its desire to see the continued development of a prosperous, multi-
racial and democratic state in Zimbabwe; 
2. Congratulates the Zimbabwe Government on the initial integration it has 
achieved in the armed forces, urges it to continue to encourage ex-ZIPRA men 
to remain in them, and welcomes the successful disarmament since independence 
of guerrilla groups; 
3. Urges that the Zimbabwe government's policy of reconciliation be sustained 
and that serious efforts to accommodate the minorities and to provide full 
civil and political rights for all individuals; 
4. Welcomes the impressive expansion by the Zimbabwe Government of universal 
education, and urges that freedom be maintained in the private sector of 
education as regards pupil intake and employment of teachers; 
5. Condemns the attacks by dissident forces in Matabeleland on innocent people 
and calls upon the Leaders of minority parties in the country to avoid recourse 
to violence for any reason; 
6. Welcomes the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry into the alleged atrocities 
committed by the Zimbabwe army in Matabeleland; 
7. Expresses concern at the detention without trial of many individuals, including 
Bishop Muzorewa and urges that all detainees are given a fair trial and not 
abused or tortured while in detention; 
8. Condemns South Africa's activities outside its borders which are Leading to 
instability in the region; 
9. Calls upon the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to invite 
the front line states and the Republic of South Africa to a round table 
conference under the Community Presidency to examine methods both of bringing 
to an end destabilizing activities by all parties and to secure the economic 
expansion of all states in Southern Africa; 
10. Urges the Government of Zimbabwe not to seek renewal of the State of Emergency 
Act, even though its continuance was part of the Lancaster House Agreement, 
and to bring to trial without delay those persons held in detention, to this 
end repealing the appropriate provisiojns of the Constitution; 
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11. Cautions the Government of Zimbabwe against allowing any kind of development 
which has the effect of ending political pluralism in Parliament and particu-
larly of no longer enabling the white minority, which the country urgently 
needs for its development, to be represented; 
12. Regrets the circumstances which have led to a large number of skilled personnel 
leaving the country, which emigration is having a detrimental effect on its 
development, and could lead to the possible breakdown of essential public 
services; 
13. Calls upon the Commission and Council in conjunction with the government of 
Zimbabwe urgently to examine the possibility of arranging crash courses in 
Member States in Government administration, telecommunications, electricity 
services, and mechanical engineering for Zimbabweans as a component of both 
Community and bilateral aid programmes to Zimbabwe; 
14. Welcomes the impartiality of the judiciary of Zimbabwe; 
15. U_r_g_e_s __ t_h_e_ Council and Commission to provide emergency aid to Zimbabwe immediately 
in the form of aid to combat the drought, and also in the form of technical 
assistance, facilities for training and support for the resettlement policy; 
16. Welcomes the work of the Commission's staff in Harare in the proper utilization 
of Community funds <EDF) and suggests that all staff engaged in this work 
should in future be officials of the Commission; 
17. Calls upon the Council and Commission, in view of the critical shortage of 
foreign exchange, to help Zimbabwean exports, especially of beef, sugar and· 
tobacco; 
18. Expects the European Community to continue to provide assistance to SAOCC 
countries and also to help Zimbabwe to develop economically in order to reduce 
its long-term dependence on South Africa; 
19. Welcomes the aid given by the Community for the building of a Veterinary 
I_n_s_ti_t_~~~ in Zimbabwe and for the training of veterinary officers; 
20. Suggests that at least 20 qualified Veterinary Surgeons be seconded to Zimbabwe 
on short-term contracts with EOF to re-establish a good veterinary service 
until Local staff can be trained to replace them; 
21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the 
Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation, the Parliaments 
of the Member States, the ACP/EEC Council of Ministers, and the Government of 
Zimbabwe. 
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B. 
1. Zimbabwe has rich natural resources, an excellent climate, areas with 
rich soil, and one of the most developed economies in Africa. It is a 
multi-racial society with fundamental rights protected by the 1980 
Constitution. 
2. On the other hand, the history of Zimbabwe in the last two decades 
has been dominated by a civil war, which lasted from 1965 to 1979, 
cost 27,000 lives, and caused widespread damage to industry, agriculture 
and communications. Not least was the damage it caused to relations 
between one group of Zimbabweans with another on grounds of colour, tribal 
origin and political beliefs. The war left an important legacy in the 
Emergency Powers legislation, enacted by the Smith regime but renewed 
annually since 1980. 
3. The most striking feature of Zimbabwe today is not, as might be 
expected, the bitterness left by a terrible civil war, but the resolve of 
the great majority of Zimbabweans to work together to realise the great 
potential of their country and to heal the wounds of the past. That resolve 
is being severely tested at present by the challenge to the government 
and people presented by the worst drought for fifty years, by the world 
economic recession and by the destabilisation policies of the Republic of 
South Africa (RSA). 
4. The importance of Zimbabwe to the European Community is manifol~ 
it is a multi-racial society with historical, cultural and economic ties 
with the West; Zimbabwe is also a signatory of the Lome Convention, a 
front-Line state neighbouring the Republic of South Africa 
and the most economically developed state in Central and Southern Africa 
apart from the Republic of South Africa. The stronger the economy 
of Zimbabwe the greater is the mutual advantage to it and to the 
Community by way of trade and the more stable the social situation in 
Zimbabwe. 
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I. ~Q~!!!f~~-§!!~~!!Q~ 
5. The Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979, which brought the 
civil war to an end and provided for free elections in February 1980 is, 
as much as the Constitution of 1979, a Living document in Zimbabwe. 
The Constitution guarantees individual and personal liberty and freedom 
of association and prohibits the use of torture and inhuman treatment. 
Although it can only be amended by unanimous vote of the Assembly, 
certain provisions can be overruled by the State of Emergency Act, 
first passed by the Assembly under the Smith regime, and renewed annually 
by the Assembly since. This Act was widely used to detain thousands 
of people during the civil war; since independence it has been used 
from time to time to detain individuals for long periods without bringing 
them to trial. 
6. There are 11 political parties in Zimbabwe but only 4 are 
represented in Parliament at present, following the elections of 27-29 
February 1980. New elections must be held by February 1985 according 
to the Constitution. The members of three of these parties were elected 
from the common roll constituencies <80 seats), and of the fourth from 
the constituencies reserved for European members <20 seats). 
(See Annex I). In 1981 the total population was 7.4 million, comprising: 
5.8 m. Shona 
1.5 m. Ndebele 
223,000 Europeans 
37,000 Asians and coloured 
7. There has been continued rivalry between the followers of 
Mr Mugabe, Prime Minister and Secretary General of the ZANU-PF Party, 
who are mainly of the Shona tribe, and those of Mr Nkomo, the leader of 
the ZAPU party1, who are mostly of the Ndebele minority. 
1 ZANU - PF: Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front 
ZAPU; Zimbabwe African People's Union <see Annex 1) 
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Speeches by several government ministers, including the Prime Minister, 
in the latter half of 1981 clearly revealed ZANU's intention to establish 
a one-party state, claiming it would make the country more united. 
They suggested the possibility of replacing the Prime ministerial system 
by one based on an executive president. However, Mr Mugabe emphasised at 
the same time that such a change would only be introduced after a national 
concensus had been reached, possibly with a referendum. In fact, the 
Constitution guarantees the right of association and this could only be 
amended by a unanimous vote of all 100 members of the Parliament. 
8. Nevertheless in forming his first Cabinet, and in subsequent Cabinet 
changes, the Prime Minister included both ZAPU and white Ministers in a 
coalition in order to overlay the dissensions caused by the civil war. 
The Cabinet still contains both ZAPU and white Ministers, although 
Mr Nkomo himself was dismissed in February 1982, following the 
discovery of large illegal arms caches in ZAPU territory in Matabeleland. 
The Government regarded such caches as evidence of a plot to overthrow it 
and has since then kept a close watch on Mr Nkomo's activities. 
Eventually in March 1983, the Government alleged that Mr Nkomo was 
contravening the law on four specific counts and he was placed under police 
surveillance. After the army had searched his house and killed three 
people there, he fled to Botswana and went on to London, whence he returned 
to Zimbabwe in September 1983. 
9. Of the other parties in Parliament, the UANC 1 is led by Bishop Muzorewa 
and has three seats. Bishop Muzorewa was arrested on 31 October 1983 as part 
of an operation 'designed to check on subversive elements connected with 
South African bandits', according to Mr Munangagwa, the Minister of State 
for Security. Bishop Muzorewa has repeatedly been accused by the Prime 
Minister of having links with the RSA, and was recently criticised by 
him for suggesting that diplanatic relations sha.Jld be established with Israel. Zirrbabwe has not 
recog1ized Israel on the gf'Ol.llds of its military coq:>eration with the RSA and of 
its Palestinian policy. Bishop Muzorewa has denied that his visit to 
Israel was for the purpose of conspiring with Israel and the RSA to 
destabilise Zimbabwe. 
fixed for his trial. 
1 See Annex 1 
At present he is detained in prison and no date has been 
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10. At the elections in February 1980 the Republican Front (RF) (formerly 
the Rhodesian Front Led by Mr Smith) won all the 20 seats in the Assembly 
which are reserved for whites. Since then, partly as a result of by-
elections and partly of defections, there are now 9 RF Members and 
11 Independents representing whites. The Independents have adopted 
a positive attitude to the government and prefer to play a full part 
in developing Zimbabwe; the RF Members appear to find it difficult to 
adapt themselves to the post-independence · situation and many of their 
supporters have Left the country. 
11. Mr Mugabe's ZANU-PF party holds 57 seats in the Assembly, and the 
great majority of these Members hold ministerial office. The central 
committee of the party exercises considerable influence over the Cabinet 
and espouses strongly Socialist policies. Your Rapporteur was told by 
a Minister that cabinet responsibility existed in Zimbabwe and that the Prime 
Minister's statements reflected Government policy. On the other hand 
Ministers were permitted to make statements which did not necessarily 
represent government policy, as they held differing views on how policy 
should develop. The government were trying to accommodate different 
points of view and to seek reconciliation after a civil war. 
Although your Rapporteur applauds these objectives, confusion and 
disquiet are obviously being caused in Zimbabwe and outside it by 
conflicting and sometimes extreme statements by Ministers, which are not 
unnaturally assumed to be government policy. 
12. The Prime Minister stated in November 1983 that at the ZANU-PF 
national congress in May 1984 the creation of a one-party state would be 
proposed in a resolution; if this was carried, the party would, after 
the elections due by February 1985 'work towards a one-party state'. 
He continued 'ZAPU has agreed with us on a one-party state, but it wants 
to be properly accommodated and we will look at how best to accommodate 
1 them'. This statement marches with one made by a Minister to your 
Rapporteur that the government had no intention of acting illegally to 
introduce a one-party state. 
1 The Herald, Harare, 19.11.83 
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13. The-Lancaster House Agreement can technically be circumvented through 
the State of Emergency Act, under which parties can legally be banned. 
If those parties voting with the government were allowed to remain, the 
semblance of a multi-party state would be upheld. But some sources claim 
that whether opposition parties are legally abolished or not is irrelevant: 
a one-party state has already been 'de facto' established in Zimbabwe. 
ZANU is consolidating its power and it is highly unlikely that it could 
lose the next election. ZANU militants are known to manifest their 
intolerance of UANC members, sometimes violently. In March 1982, 
the Government announced its intention of eventually reducing the number of 
white seats in Parliament. The power of patronage of ZANU in the Civil 
Service is being fully exploited. Strong ZANU support was a prerequisite 
for appointments to nearly all the new heads of department for the 
University of Zimbabwe. Most companies feel obliged to _donate to party 
funds in order to receive government contracts. Some sources feel 
that Parliament is becoming little more than a rubber stamp, with most 
key decisions being made by the party central committee. 
now meets in only three months every year. 
Parliament 
14. Observers in 1981 felt that the integration of the armed forces was 
going smoothly, but with the heightened tensions between ZAPU and ZANU , 
the number of deserters began to rise, most of them being ex-ZIPRA 
(pro-Nkomo) members. In response to the deteriorating situation, 
Prime Minister Mugabe created the 5th Brigade, a group of 5,000 men, 
mostly of Shona origin and all former ZANLA guerillas, trained and 
equipped by North Korea. This marked the first violation of the 
principle of ZANLA/ZIPRA integration. The Brigade answers directly 
to the Prime Minister and it was feared that it would be used to impose 
a one-party state, especially since Mr Nkomo was not consulted about 
its formation. Mr Mugabe repeatedly stated that it would never be 
used in Matabeleland, but the situation in the area deteriorated, as the 
Ndebele community there felt that they had profited little from independence, 
especially in comparison with the Shonas. 
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15. This led to insurgent activitiy seeking solutions to social and economic 
grievances, which was however politicised by three events in February 1982. 
First, the hidden anmscaches were discovered. Then Mr Nkomo was excluded 
from the government. Finally, 100 members of the Ndebele forces 
were arrested, including General 'Lookout' Musuka and Mr Dumiso Dabengua, 
former ZIPRA Leaders. THe number of deserters increased from 500 at 
the beginning of 1982 to between 2,500 and 4,000 by April 1983. 
The situation in Matabeleland grew very serious: buses were intercepted, 
banks and stores were robbed, farms were attacked, people were ambushed, 
etc. Furthermore, there was a wave 
white people; over sao killings are 
to have been led by the former ZIPRA 
of assassinations, particularly of 
attributed to the insurgents, said 
(1) 
army deserters. 
16. Although until the end of 1982 the dissident activity was not viewed 
as a real threat to the government, it judged it essential to prevent any 
signs of weakness or anarchy, in order to circumvent a possible inter-
vention by South Africa. Police and army forces in the area were stepped 
up, and a curfew was declared in July in the area to the west of Bulawayo, 
where the police suspected the dissidents were taking refuge. 
On 25 July 6 foreign tourists <2 English, 2 Americans and 2 Australians) 
were kidnapped. As a result searches and identification controls were 
multiplied, the curfew zone was extended and non-government vehicles 
were restricted <until November). By November 425 dissidents had been 
captured by the army. The curfew and prohibition on circulation aggravated 
conditions in the region, which had already been affected by the worst 
drought since 1947. In January 1983 Mr Mugabe judged the situation to 
be uncontrollable, and sent in the 5th Brigade to West-Matabeleland to 
restore order partly because it was feared that, if integrated units 
were to be sent, the loyalty of the Ndebele elements in them would be 
severely tested. This force was composed of former ZANLA <Mugabe 
forces> guerillas, 5,000 strong, mostly of Shona origin and trained 
and equipped by North Korea. 
1 Le Monde, 3.11.1982 
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17. It is clear that respect for human rights has greatly increased by 
comparison with the actions of the illegal Smith regime during the 
civil war. Only in Matabeleland have there been violations of human 
rights by the Government on a serious scale. The Government claim to have 
been acting on behalf of the majority in quelling a dissident minority, 
mainly Ndebele supporters of Mr Nkomo, which was being abetted by the 
RSA as part of its destabilisation policy. 
18. The automatic renewal every 6 months of a State of Emergency, 
introduced in 1965 under the Smith government, increases the possibility 
of abuse of Civil Rights. This Act, most recently extended in 
January 1984r authorises the use of incommunicado detention without 
charge or trial for up to 30 days, the confiscation of property in 
conditions of a state of war of anyone believed to be an 'enemy agent' r the seizure of passports, 
search and arrest without warrants, and for detention orders of indefinite duration, 
among others. Many allegations of police excesses have been confirmed. 
Prisoners in Harare have shown their scars from torture during 
interrogation and affirmed that others were beaten to death. 
The six detained Air Force officers claimed that their 'confessions' 
were obtained by torture and one has published a detailed account of this1 • 
All the officers have now been released, but have had to leave Zimbabwe. 
Detention is sometimes used to bypass the judiciary altogether. 
1 Daily Telegraph, 7.2.84. 
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1 
19 It is impossible to know how many people have died; estimates 
(1) 
vary between 1,500 and 3,000 persons • Several thousand refugees 
have fled their homes to Botswana. The government claims that most 
f h . . l. . . h . f. ( 2) . . o t e c1v1 1ans were v1ct1ms caug t 1n cross 1re and den1es accusat1ons 
of misconduct. But the sheer weight and consistency of the evidence, 
most of which comes from refugees, indicates otherwise. In addition, 
several religious groups and independent relief organisations, doctors 
and diplomats have confronted the government with detailed reports 
substantiated by case histories, photographs, statements by witnesses, 
Locations of corpses, and a List of over 200 individuals known .to have 
died during the first two weeks of the campaign(3). Government 
supporters give further credence to the allegations by privately admitting 
the killings, while arguing that they are justified by the need to quell 
dissidence which is being abetted by South Africa(4). 
20. Early in 1983 the government replaced the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland 
by the British-trained, integrated 2nd Brigade. Following protests in 
March 1983 by 12 human rights organisations, which included a request 
for the appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry, a four-man 
commission was set up in September to investigate violations of human 
rights in Matabeleland. In September 1983 doubts of the Government about 
the Loyalty to it of elements of the 2nd Brigade led to its replacement 
by the 5th Brigade yet again. 
Reports to religious missions, le Monde, 11.3.83 
2 M. Sekeramyi, Minister of State for Defence, Le Monde, 11.2.83 
3 Guardian, 23.3.83 
4 Ibid. and Financial Times, 6.1.83, quoting Mr. Munangagwa, Minister of 
Security 
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II. EQB~!§~_EQ~!£Y 
2 t The focus of interest in Zimbabwe's foreign policy is its relationship 
with the Republic of South Africa. Political and diplomatic relations 
have been officially broken off since September 1980, but economic and 
trade links have been maintained and each country maintains a trade 
mission in the other. Relations reached a low point in 1981. In June 
of that year, Mr Mugabe stated that Zimbabwe intended to support the 
Liberation Movements fighting in Namibia and South Africa diplomatically 
and politically through the OAU, although it was not prepared to give bases tp 
SWAPO and African National Congress (ANC) guerillas. 
In retaliation, in August 1981 South Africa refused to renew the 
work permits of thousands of black Zimbabweans living there, of whom more 
than 20,000 were officially registered workers, but many more were 
living there illegally. South Africa also threatened not to renew the 
preferential trade agreement in 1982, but in fact eventually did so. 
Zimbabwe's economy, like that of other countries in the region, except 
those of Angola and Tanzania, is heavily dependent on South Africd, 
especially as regards sources of supply, markets and transport, particularly by rail. 
Most important is the South African railway system, which links the 
land-locked states with overseas markets and supplies through either 
their own ports, or those in Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania. 
22. Evidence of Pretorian involvement in destabilisation is mounting. 
In July 1982, commandos using South African equipment sabotaged Zimbabwe's 
new fleet of fighters at Gweru, comprising nearly 2/3 of the Air 
Force. South African soldiers have been killed or captured during raids 
as have self-confessed South African spies, and the Ndebele language 
'Radio Truth' broadcasts its attacks on the Mugabe government into 
Matabeleland from the Transvaal. In December 1982, Mr Emmerson 
Munangagwa, the Zimbabwean Minister responsible for security, claimed 
that four camps in Northern Transvaal housed 4,000 anti-Mugabe Zimbabweans, 
recruited from Ndebele refugees, who were infiltrated into Zimbabwe 
where they posed as supporters of Mr Nkomo and 'commit crimes, make 
roadblocks and kill people'(1). On 25 February 1983, Prime Minister 
(1) Financial Times, 6.1.1983 
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Mugabe declared for the first time publicly that South Africa was supporting 
the current rebellion in Matabeleland, allied with ZAPU forces. 
23. When Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980, Prime Minister Mugabe 
announced his intention of following a foreign policy of strict non-alignment. 
Diplomatic relations were formally established between Zimbabwe and many 
Western countries, including France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Italy and the United States. Zimbabwe also announced that it would continue 
to maintain and strengthen its alliances with China, Yugoslavia and 
Romania, which had given support to the ZANU wing of the Patriotic Front 
Alliance during the war. Later in the year, relations were established 
with Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and East Germany. Plans made under Bishop 
Muzorewa's regime for establishing diplomatic ties with Israel were 
dropped. In Africa, Mr Mugabe established particularly close ties with 
Mozambique and Zambia and the front-line states. He stated that he 
would not refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, 
which had supported Mr Nkomo, if they wished to do so, but he would not 
seek them. An agreement was finally reached in February 1981 with Poland, 
but the USSR only started taking steps to establish an embassy in Harare 
at the end of that year. 
24. Independent Zimbabwe has recently developed its relations with 
the Warsaw Pact countries. On 6 May 1983 the Zimbabwe-Romania Joint 
Commission held its first meeting to discuss cooperation in economic 
fields. The two countries have already signed friendship, trade, 
agricultural and cultural agreements. In May 1983 Mr Mugabe made a 10-
day official visit to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic 
Republic, when agreements on economic, political, technical and 
cultural cooperation were signed. The Prime Minister said the trip 
had served to 'consolidate relations between Eastern. Europe and ourselves'. 
This does not necessarily mark a shift to the left in t:1e non-alignment policy, 
as Zi111babwe's economic ties with the East are in no sense comparable with 
those with the West. A visit by Mr Mugabe to the Soviet Union planned for 
19~3 did not t~ke place, and no date has yet been fixed for it. 
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25. On independence, Zimbabwe became the 43rd member of the Commonwealth 
and applied for membership in the Lome Convention, but did not officially 
become a member until March 1982. It continued its 
participation in the non-aligned Movement, which the Patriotic Front had 
joined in 1979. Zimbabwe became the 50th member state of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in June 1980, and the 153rd of the 
United Nations on 25 August. (It was elected on 1 January 1983 to serve 
on the Security Council for two years as a non-permanent member). In 
September 1980 Zimbabwe joined the World Bank and its affiliate, the 
International Development Association (IDA), the African Development 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It also became the 111th 
member of the International Atomic Energy Agency ~IAEA) in September 1981. 
A. Tb!LQ!Q~9b! 
26. In 1981 and 1982, the southern and western areas of Zinbabwe experienced their 1o0rst d~t 
and highest t~ratures for 50 years. By Feb r u a r y 1 9 8 4 i n s u f f i c i en t 
rain had fallen ... and fears existed of a third year of drought. All 
those whom your Rapporteur consulted in Zimbabwe were agreed that a third 
year of drought would be disastrous. The maize crop for 1983-84 is 
forecast as 610,000 tonnes, or only 30% of that for 1981-82. Winter wheat 
production, at 124?000 tonnes, is expected to be only 53% of the previous 
season's crop. Production of oilseeds will be considerably reduced. 
Only sugar and tobacco prociJction has increased. As a result of the 
drought,earnings from agricultural exports will be Zimbabwean$ 40 million 
Lower this year1 Almost half of the population of 7.6 million will require to 
receive food aid from the State, at a cost of about US$ 100 million. 
1 In November 1983 1 Zimbabwean$= US$ 1.03 
- 18 - PE 86.470/fin. 
27. Legal independence was a stimulus to the Zimbabwe economy, mainly 
because the UN lifted its trade sanctions. 1981 and 1982 were marked 
by extraordinary growth due to excellent farm seasons, <notwithstanding 
the drought, which has particularly affected the southern and western 
parts of the country), access to international markets and the massive 
inflow of aid. The prospects for 1983 are, however, bleak. The IMF 
estimates an inflation rate of at least 17%, which is expected to be 
exceeded. There is an external debt of Z$ 1,500 million with a 16% 
debt-serving rate. The deficit for the first half of 1983 was 
Z$ 243 million <US$ 252.4m) 84% over the target. The Standard Bank's 
February 1983 forecast predicted that instead of 0% growth previously 
expected, there will be -3% growth in real GNP. There are several 
reasons for this pessimistic outlook. First the world recession is 
decreasing demand and export prices, while import prices and interest 
rates on loans are rising. Transport costs are high because Zimbabwe 
has no natural gas or oil of its own; yet its fuel consumption has gone 
up 50% since independence. 
28. Prime Minister Mugabe restated in November 1983 the objectives of the 
government in regard to industry and manufactures as being to establish 
state enterprises or cooperatives; to invest in existing companies by 
negotiation; and to promote workers• committees. These objectives, he 
said, did not involve nationalisation. This statement follows one in 
April 1983 which foresaw possible government control of the grain milling, 
fuel procurement and transport industries; nevertheless, the budget for 
1983-84 provided for a reduction in investment. 
c. ~srif~i!~r~ 
29. In March 1982 26.5% of the work force of Zimbabwe were employed 
in agriculture and forestry, the next highest percentage being in 
manufacturing <17%). In 1981, agricultural products accounted for 
40% of foreign currency earnings, of which unmanufactured tobacco 
accounted for 23%, and other products <mainly cotton lint and raw sugar) 
17%. 
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30. The tobacco industry is of primordial importance to Zimbabwe. 
It is organised by private enterprise into a growers' body and a merchant 
and manufacturing body; the private enterprise marketing body is overseen 
by a statutory marketing board. All sectors are inter-linked and work 
together closely and harmoniously. The industry operates without 
financial assistance from the government. There are 1,200 growers, 
the average size of holdings being 42 hectares. Zimbabwe exports 
46% of its tobacco to the EEC by a quota arrangement under the Lome 
Convention and wishes at least to maintain its quota, in order to earn 
foreign currency, which it desperately needs. Tobacco from Zimbabwe can 
be blended into Italian tobacco, and the two products are complementary 
one to the other. It is vital for Zimbabwe therefore that its tobacco 
quota for import to the EEC is at least maintained, if not increased1and 
the European Parliament should take action to this end. 
31. Under Lome·convention arrangements, Zimbabwe is allotted an annual 
quota for import into the EEC of 8,100 tonnes of high-quality beef. 
However for some years such imports have been prohibited by the EEC on 
account of outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in the Zimbabwe 
cattle herd; this represents a serious loss of foreign currency to the 
country and of income to its producers of top-class beef. To help contain 
and combat foot-and-mouth disease, the EEC has contributed towards the cost 
of a vaccination campaign and of erecting fences in the Bulawayo area and in the South East corner of 
Zimbabwe. The object of the fences is to create a buffer zone between 
disease--carrying African buffalo in the national parks and game reserves in 
these areas, and cattle in adjacent farms, and also between non-vaccinated and 
vaccinated cattle. A further measure consists in the elimination of buffalo 
from the areas concerned; in addition, before cattle are transported from 
one area to another, t~ey have by law to be vaccinated and branded. 
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32. Doubt was cast in certain circles in Harare however about the efficacy of 
these measures. It was claimed that as a result of a breakdown in law 
and order as fast as the fences were constructed, the wire disappeared; that 
control on cattle movement was lax; and that veterinary officers were unable 
to operate in Matabeleland. Of 19 Ministry of Agriculture veterinary 
officers who had resigned in 1982, 16 had been born in Zimbabwe and, although a 
veterinary institute was under construction in Harare, there was a clamant and 
immediate need for trained personnel who could help to control cattle diseases. 
During his visit your Rapporteur was told that only seven government veterinary 
officers were in post in the whole country. This would appear to be an area 
for priority action by the Zimbabwe Government, for as soon as foot-and-mouth 
disease is controlled, exports to the EEC can be resumed to its financial 
advantage. 
Er2!~£!i2Q_Qf_f~rm~!§ 
33. Commercial farmers (who are mainly white) face problems arising from 
dissident activity in Matabeleland, and from squatters. Your Rapporteur 
was told that South and West of Bulawayo the dissidents were comprised of 
ex-Z IPRA Guerrillas, 1 super-ZAPU 1 guerrillas assisted by the RSA, and common 
bandits. The lives of commercial farmers were so endangered that recourse 
had had to be made to protective measures first used during the civil 
war, such as direct radio contact between farmers in the bush and their 
farms and police posts, and protected vehicles. Commercial farms in 
Matabeleland had become unsaleable and even the government would not 
purchase them. In the North and South East areas of Zimbabwe squatters, 
often refugees from Mozambique, had moved on to commercial farms. 
These factors had encouraged white farmers in South West Zimbabwe to seek 
refuge in towns or to leave the country, just when their expertise was 
most required. 
not in danger. 
Elsewhere in the country, it was emphasised, farmers were 
34. One of the immediate projects the new government tackled after independence 
was the resettlement of blacks from overcrowded communal lands onto formerly 
white-owned land. The target was 162,000 peasant families (1 million people) 
by 1985. Up to November 1983 32,000 families have been resettled under 
the normal intensive scheme, and about 6,000 families under the accelerated 
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resettlement scheme. Success in this project is important politically for 
ZANU, and economically for a country whose population is growing at 3.3% 
per year. 2.8 million ha.have been purchased by the government on a 
'willing seller-willing buyer' basis, financed as to 50% by the UK Government 
and 50% by the Zimbabwe Government. Plots vary in size between 20 ha of 
good, and 100 ha of poor, land, the average plot being 60 ha. Seeds and 
fertilisers are given to resettled families for the first year, after which 
Long- and medium-term credit is provided by the EEC, which has granted 
4m. ECU for normal schemes. The Zimbabwe Government is seeking a further 
5.45 million ECU. Community grants are used to provide infrastructure 
for normal schemes, e.g. roads, bridges, fencing, clinics and schools, of which 
schools are built by the resettled families, clinics by contractors, and 
other services by government direct Labour. 
35. Accelerated schemes, in which the average plot is 12 ha, are based on 
government purchase of small farms and use of existing infrastructure. 
The EEC is assisting by upgrading the existing infrastructure in order to 
hasten resettlement. Inevitably, there have been problems, one of the 
most intractable being the continuing severe drought. Others are a 
shortage of capital; inadequate numbers of experts to advise people new 
to farming; and unwillingness to abandon traditional farming methods. 
Nevertheless, the resettlement policy is of cardinal importance to Zimbabwe, 
and should be pursued with the utmost energy by the government; EEC aid 
has been well-directed but the drought emergency calls for a special effort 
by the Community to ensure that the momentum of resettlement is maintained. 
The Chisumbanje project to create plots for 12,000 people over 12-15 years 
in a 40,000 ha scheme on rich, irrigated soil in the Lowveld, in South 
East Zimbabwe, has attracted interest from British banks and is worthy of study 
by the Community. 
36. Industry in Zimbabwe faces substantial, but not insoluble, difficulties. 
Paramount among them is a serious Lack of external investment, which is 
required to modernise existing, and to develop new, industries, and the 
effects of the world recession. The recession has restricted markets for 
exports from Zimbabwe, and led to commodity stock-piles which are forcing 
down prices, e.g. of minerals. Disincentives to investment include strict 
controls on expatriation of profits, slowness in decision-making by government, 
an apparent Lack of any overall plan for encouraging investment, strict price 
controls by the government and a moribund stock exchange. 
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37. In 1979 the mining industry was responsible for almost one-half of 
Zimbabwe's export earnings, although it accounted for only 8% of GOP and 
employed only about 6% of the labour force. In 1980, 34 different minerals were 
produced and sold at a total value of Z$ 416m. In order of importance, the 
main ones were gold, asbestos, nickel, copper, coal and chromium. The value of 
mineral output in 1982 was put at Z$ 383m. down by 8.7% from 1980, but the 
volume was the lowest for 11 years. The recession in world metal prices 
continued in 1982 and resulted in the closure of many mines. Exploration 
activity came to a virtual standstill during the guerrilla war but has now 
resumed, with more than 50 exploration programmes started during the first two 
years of independence. Disquiet has been expressed, by both local and 
foreign firm~over the government's placing of the marketing of all minerals u~der 
a state-controlled Minerals Marketing Corporation in 1982. The companies claim 
that this will discourage private investment in the sector. Official policy 
has limited retrenchment to save costs so although employment in 1982 fell by 
4,500 there are still an estimated 3,000 surplus miners. Mining faces a shortage 
of skilled manpower and, in spite of a considerable level of training, the 
situation may not change much in the immediate future. Transport problems 
have limited the exports of bulk, low-value minerals such as chromium 
and coal. Partly because the mining sector has no control over the price of its 
output on world markets, and partly because of current depressed prices of 
minerals, there is considerable concern within the sector regarding the 
potential impact of further cost increases. 
3& Delays in decision-making by government, especially on allocation of 
foreign currency for imports, on major schemes for investment from abroad, and 
on allowing price increases e.g. for steel and maize, were heavily 
criticised by industrial and commercial leaders, and also admitted by the 
government. Yet relations between industry and Ministers were said to be 
good. The govemnent has invested in a large hotel and conference centre in 
Harare, but apart fran a Zi:Jh:lbwe $150 milliCX'l project for a, pulp mill, it was admitted 
that industry had never discussed a long-term investment strategy with 
the government. Ministers drew attention to heavy transport costs, 
particularly of steel and minerals, through Mozambique or the RSA to the 
coast. They claimed that the steel industry, though making heavy losses, 
was essential to the economies of the SADCC countries. They agreed that 
a satisfactory Zimbabwe stock exchange was necessary, and were preparing 
amending legislation in order to strengthen it. 
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3~ One of the main reasons for slowness in government decision-making 
which was cited to your rapporteur was the departure of whites from middle-
rank posts in the civil service and the Lack of trained blacks to take 
their places. This is a legacy of the refusal of the Smith regime to 
train blacks in preparation for majority rule, and highlights the need 
for accelerated training programmes. Your rapporteur was also told of 
serious shortages of skilled artisans in sectors such as engineering 
and telecommunications, and of trained teachers and agricultural experts, 
e.g. veterinary officers. 
4Q The white community, which numbered 275,000 in the mid-1970s, now 
stands at 140,000. Between 1980 and 1982 alone 64,000 whites Left the 
country, and the recent monthly emigration rate of whites has been about 
1,500. The principal anxieties of white Zimbabweans are a decline in 
standards of schooling and health care, poor prospects of employment for 
their children in Zimbabwe, price controls, and restrictions on sending 
money abroad. While your rapporteur was in Harare, the Minister of 
Education, Dr. Mutu.Ouka, announced that the 27 private schools in Zimbabwe, 
most of which have a Church connection, must from January 1984 have at 
Least AO% black pupils, and ~ventually 60r black teachers, and that not more 
than Z$ 500 per term could be charged in fees. 1 The immediate reaction among 
whites was one of dismay, as it is known that insufficient qualified black 
teachers are available to maintain standards of schooling, 2 and currency 
restrictions prevent whites sending their children to school outside 
Zimbabwe. Although the Minister has since controverted this statement, 
the damage has been done and the ensuing uncertainty will serve to increase 
white emigration, which has already reached a critical Level for the future 
management of agriculture, industry and commerce. 
IV. DEVELOPMENT 
-----------
A. §8Qff 
41. Your Rapporteur dealt at some Length with the SADCC countries in his 
r~port on Southern Africa, on which Parliament adopted a resolution in 
February 1983. 3 He remains convinced that the SADCC deserves the maximum 
amount of support from the Community, particularly in the short-term 
in the form of drought relief, and in assistance for training black 
Zimbabweans for employment in teaching, government service, and in the 
skilled trades necessary to sustain the economy. 
1 Tre average fee charged at present is Z$ 600 - 800 per term 
2 In1981, 60% of teaching staff at University and other higher education institutions had a University 
degree; 481. of secondary school teachers had certificates of education; and 82% of primary education 
teaching staff had 1-3 years of secondary education. <National Mar-power Survey 1981>. 
3 Report on behalf of Political Cannittee by Sir J. Scott-Hopkins, Rapporteur (Doc. 1-657/82) 4 Octcber 
1981; RESOLution of the European Parl iC~~~ent C 68, 14.3.83, p. 42 · · 
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42. Zimbabwe requested admission to the Lome Convention on the day of its 
independence, 18 April 1980, and the agreement on its admission entered 
into force on 1 March 1982. It was granted admission to the special 
regime for certain States on the exports of beef and veal. In turn, Zimbabwe 
undertook to use the revenue accrued from taxes on these exports to meet 
national priorities in the livestock sector, relating to small-holder 
production. As Zimbabwe was a party to the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, it 
was granted entry as a member of the Protocol on ACP sugar. It was also 
given special attention as it is a land-locked State. 
43. EEC aid to Zimbabwe can be classified under four main headings -
that granted in 1980 before accession to the Lome II Convention; that 
under the National Indicative Programme; that derived from regional 
projects; and drought aid. <See Annex II). Unde~ the first heading, 
16m. ECU was approved in 1980 as emergency aid and food aid (mainly for 
returning refugees) and reconstruction of infrastructure in peasant 
farming areas. In 1981, 14.Sm. ECU was approved, principally for the 
construction of rural clinics, for educational facilities and equipment, 
and to assist resettlement (Annex II, section A). The latest (provisional> 
figures for the review of the National Indicative Programme show that 
27.7Sm. ECU has been granted for agriculture and rural development; 
10.Sm. ECU for training; ?.Sm. ECU for economic infrastructure <mainly 
drilling for water); and 3.02m. ECU for supporting activities. Including 
a reserve, the grand total under this programme is 49m. ECU. 
<Annex II, section 8). 
44. Zimbabwe is also benefiting directly from current regional 
projects covering the SADCC countries, to the extent of 32m. ECU. 
Of this sum 12.8m. ECU has been committed to control of foot-and-mouth 
disease and 8m. ECU to control of the tsetse fly. (Annex II, section C). 
Finally, drought aid approved up to November 1983 amounts to 9.7m. ECU, 
of which about Sm. ECU is for emergency supplies of beans, and 2.8m. ECU 
for an accelerated drought relief programme <Annex II, section 0). 
The administration of aid under these four headin~ especially as a rapid 
response to the serious drought, calls for special qualities of judgement, 
initiative and dedication. Your Rapporteur found that the staff working 
in the Commission's delegation brought these qualities, in particula~ to 
their work, and wishes to record his appreciation of them. He was 
therefore distressed to learn that only two were Commission officials and 
that the others, as employees of the European Agency for Cooperation 
<EAC) were on short-term contracts without the arrangements for promotion 
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and pensions enjoyed by full officials of the Commission. Your rapporteur 
is of opinion that the Commission has allowed this situation to carry on 
for far too long and should take early steps to regularise it. 
45
• Zimbabwe also has extensive agreements with the Member States 
of the Community. For example, in negotiations held during the 
first quarter of 1983, France agreed to provide US$ 40 million in aid 
to be used to finance public sector projects and commodity aid programmes 
to the private sector. A £20 million (US$ 30.9m) aid agreement between 
the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe was concluded on 31 January 1983 -
a £5 million grant from the funds pledgee at ZIMCORD and a £15 million 
loan. West Germany is to provide Z$ 29 million <US$ 30m.> in aid in 
1983. 
46~ The World Bank is Zimbabwe's leading individual donor. The US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) had committed US$ 50 million by 
January 1983 through the Commodity Import Program <CIP) which makes 
foreign exchange available for imports. This has not been fully 
disbursed. Talks have begun for a second CIP of approximately US$ 37m. 
- 80% to go to the private sector and 20% to the public. President Reagan 
requested security assistance for 1982-1983 of US$ 78.2 million: 
this has recently been approved by Congress despite substantial opposition 
on Human Rights grounds. This amount is due to stay the same in 
1983-1984. The development aid requested for 1982-1983 is 
US$ 75 million, to be reduced to zero in 1983-1984, and the projected 
foreign military sales credits for that year are to equal US$ 3 million. 
An approved US$ 45 million agricultural scheme has yet to be used. 
47. Japan signed an aid agreement on 28 March 1983 worth Z$ 3 million, 
and China has committed US$ 33 million. North Korean aid has been 
primarily in the military sector. By the end of 1V80, it had given 
US$ 16 million to finance the training and equipping of the 5th 
Brigade; 106 advisers were sent in August 1981 (of whom all but 3 were 
asked to leave in August 1982). The equipment- tanks, artillery and 
light arms- was valued at Z$ 12.5 million and given as an unconditional 
gift; it was all manufactured in the Soviet Union. It should be 
pointed out that in June 1980, Prime Minister Mugabe refused to allow 
the army to bring in Soviet-made tanks and MIG aircraft from Zambia as they 
would require spare parts and instructors, a dependence on the USSR 
he did not wish to accept. 
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48. Finally, Zimbabwe receives aid from several international 
financial organisations. For example, a USS 10 million credit was 
granted in January by the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 
<BADEA) for a 3 year road development programme. The World Bank 
approved a US$ 26.4 million, 20 year loan for the same project in May. 
The IMF granted a loan in March for SDR 56.1 million <worth US$ 60.5m.). 
An 18-month standby facility for SDR 300 million (worth US$ 323.7m.) 
was also agreed upon, to reduce government financial imbalances. 
49. His discussions in Harare have led your Rapporteur to the conviction 
that the leadership given by the Government to the country since independence 
has done much to heal the wounds caused by the civil war and to laythe 
foundations for a multi-racial state based on a sound economy. This is a 
remarkable achievement <which incidentally has largely been overlooked by 
the European press), especially in the face of a devastating drought and 
of pers; stent insurgent activity anj attenpts at ~tabil isatia~ by the RSA. Nevertheless, 
anxieties remain in Zimbabwe about human rights, about continued dissidence 
in Matabeleland, about the future of white Zimbabweans, and about shortages 
in trained and skilled personnel. The Community can help Zimbabwe to 
combat the effects of the drought, and with training and resettlement, 
providing markets for tobacco, sugar and other agricultural products, 
and aid both direct and through SADCC. It is for the government however 
to allay anxieties felt in the Community about human right~to remove 
as far as possible the motivation to dissidence, and to safeguard the rights 
and position of all minorities by applying the leadership, determination 
and dynamism in these fields which it has shown in so many others. 
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Majority party with 57 seats; African nationalist, socialist. 
Pre-independence links with China 
President and Secretary-General : Robert Mugabe 
Wing of the original Patriotic front Alliance with ZANU 
20 seats (15 from the 16 allotted to Matabeleland) 
Leofit wing; la-g-standing links with the Soviet Union 
Leader : Joshua Nkomo 
Acting President : Josiah Chinamano 
Secretary-General : Joseph Msika 
3 seats : African Nationalist, moderate 
President : Bishop Abel Muzorewa 
Secretary-General : Edward Mazaiwana 
Won all 20 guaranteed European seats in the elections, 
but today only holds 8. 
Leader : Ian Smith 
12 seats 
Conservative 
Leader : Henry Chihota 
Leader : Nick McNally 
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<7> ~ni!~9-~~1i2n~!_f~9~r~!iQo_f~r1~-1~~ff! 
Conservative 
Leader : Chief Kayisa Ndiweri 
<8> Zimbabwe African National Union - Sithole <ZANU - 5) 
----------------------------------------------------
Centrist : splinter group 'from ZANU-PF and UANC 
President : Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole 
Traditionalist; splinter group from UANC 
Leader : James Chikerema 
<10> ~im~~~~~-~~!iQO~!_f!QO! 
Leader : Peter Mandaza 
<11> ~im~~~~~-~ni1~9_fQ~e!~~~-Qrg~oi~~!iQo_1~~fQ! 
Leader Jeremiah Chirau 
[(12> Q~mQ£!~!i£_f~!!~ was the alternative white party, supporting 
the Mugabe government, led by Andre Holland. But they dissolved 
in May, 1982 after failing to win any seats in the by-elections.] 
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1. Emergency Aid 
<via UN High Commission for Refugees) 
- for resettlement of refugees 
<8.3 MECU) 
- for livestock control 
(1.1 MECU) 
2. Food Aid 
- for returning refugees 
(via UNHCR and OXFAM) 
3. Cofinancing with NGOs (17 projects) 
4. Non-Associated Programme 1980 (NA 80) 
- Reconstruction of Infrastructure in 
Peasant Farming Areas CNA 80-4) 
• Equipment for reconstruction of 
rural feeder roads, 1.25 ECU 
• Reconstruction of NGO cattle 
dip tanks, 2.75 MECU 
TOTAL 1980 
-30 -
9.4 
1.2 
1.4 
4.0 
16.0 
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1. ~2D:~~~2£i!!~9_er29!!mm~_12~Q 
a) Rural Clinics CNA 80-41> 
Cofinancing with Government of con-
struction and equipment of 115 rural 
health clinics 
b) Educational facilities and equipment 
CNA 80-40) 
- Gwelo Technical College 
<construction and equipment), 2.2.MECU 
- Equipment for University of Zimbabwe, 
faculties of Agriculture and of 
engineering, 0.3 MECU 
- Basic science kits for 487 secondary 
schools, 0.5 MECU 
c) National Extension 
Services (NA 80-39) 
4.5 
3.0 
1.5 
d) Intensive Resettlement Programme <NA 80-38) 4.0 
Cofinancing with UK and Zimbabwe 
Government of a comprehensive rural pro-
gramme including infrastructure and land 
cultivation 
e> Study Programme CNA 80-42) 1.0 
- Rural Development Study 
Mashonaland East; 0.6 MECU 
- Smallholder Coffee Development Study 
- Smallholder Fruit and Tree Nut 
Development Study 
f) Technical Assistance Programme <NA 80-43) 0.5 
TOTAL: 
Three experts <60 men/months> to Ministry 
of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 
to prepare development projects. 
Non-Associated Programme approved in 1981 
2. f2fiD!D£iD9-~i!h-~§Q~~ 
<6 projects) 
TOTAL 1981 
-31 -
14.5 
0.3 
14.8 
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B. !~~~~-!~-~~~!~~-Qf_~~!!Q~8b_!~Q!f8!!~~-~~Q§~8~~~-i~!~l-iE!QYl§lQD~!, 
~QY~!!!~~L12§~> 
MECU 
A. 89ri£~!!~r~-~D9-~~r~!_Q~y~!: 
QE!!!~D! 
1) Mashonaland East ) 7 X 
2) Coffee/Fruit Development ) 4 X ) 
3) Accelerated Resettlement 
Programme 5.45 X 
3 bi s> Technical Assistance 
to Ministry of Lands and Rural 0.3 X 
Deve lq::ment 
7 4) Micro-projects X X 
5) Tsetse Control Project 
(part from NIP) 2 X 
6) Credit line Farm Irrigation 
Fund <a> 2 
TOTAL 27.75 
(a) as shown 
B. Q~~~!QE!!!~O!_Qf_tl~!!!~O-B~§Q~!f~§ 
1) 'Multi-Annual Training 1 • 4 X X Proqramme' 
2) Veterinary Faculty (part 
from NIP) 7.5 X 
3) Gweru Technical College 
(training of trainers) 1.4 X 
4) Training of Medical 
Assistants CRural Clinics) Q~f- X 
TOTAL 10.5 
c. ~fQOQ!!!if_!O!!~§!!~f!~!~ 
1. ~~r~!-~~!~r_§~ee!~ 2.5 X 
. Drilling programme 
Masvingo 4.0 X 
. Drilling programme 
Matabeleland 
2. ~0~!9~-Q~y~!QE!!!~O! 
2.1 . Coal utilisation study ~ 0.5 X 2.2. Alternative energy Q~~ X 
TOTAL 7.5 
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D. ~~QQQ!!i~9-~f!iYi!i~§ 
1 ) Rural Technology 
Exhibitipn <1982) 0.12 
2) Trade Promotion 0.3 
3) Studies <beef marketing ) 
study ) 
Water consultancy ) 0.3 
4) Prep. of Lome III, short-) 
term consultancies and 
reserve 
TOTAL 
Reserve 
Grand total National 
Indicative Programme 
Foot and Mouth Disease 
Veterinary Faculty, Harare 
Tsetse Control 
Trade Fairs 
) 
) f.:.~ 
3.02 
0.27 
49.00 
Reintegration of African Nationals 
SADCC Secretariat Technical assistance 
ESARIPO (Industrial patents) 
-33 -
~g~ 
12.8 
5.5 
8.0 
0.15 
3.3 
2.0 
0.5 
32.25 
X 
~Q!!!!!!i!!~g 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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X 
X 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
D. DROUGHT AID 1983 APPROVED BY EEC AS OF 30 NOVEMBER, 1983 
Emergency Aid 
1 300 000 ECU = about 1 500 t. for 
hyprobeans (processed soya beans> 
200 000 ECU = about 2 000 t. for salt 
Emergency Food Aid 
Dry beans <about 1 500 t.> 
Dry beans for drought relief (6 000 t.) 
Sub-total 
Rural Water Supply - Accelerated 
Programme for Drought Relief in 
Victoria-Province 
(Project is part of Zimbabwe's normal 
Indicative Aid Programme but was 
specifically designed as a drought 
relief drilling programme and was 
approved extremely rapidly> 
Cattle Rescue Operation 
No extra funds, but EEC approved 
inclusicn of this new item under the 
agreed use of Food Aid counterpart 
funds> · 
Total 
1) 500 000 ECU plus transport costs 
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1 000 ECU 
1 500 
5751) 
plus transport cost 
3 100 
5 175 
2 800 
1 750 
9 725 
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Motion for a resolution <Doc. 1-1064/82> 
tabled by Mr MARSHALL and others 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on political rights in Zimbabwe 
-----------------------
A. - confir•ing its belief in deaocracy ~~ tht civil rights of 
all, 
a. r~m~mbering the ~elcomt g1ven by the Com-unity to 
Z1mca~~e•s achiev•ent of de-ocracy 1nd independence, 
c. c~ncerned At recent recorts of interference ~ith the 
pol1t1cal •nd civ1l rights of v1rious cr~tics of the 
Government of Zi.Oab~t, 
1. Requests the Ziebabwe Govern .. nt to safeg~rd the rights 
of •ll citilen•; 
?. Ur~~~ th•t the future of co .. unity lid to Zi.O.bwe be re• 
txl••ntd if such r1;~ts 1re not Slftgu•rded; 
3. Requests its Pres1dent to sub•it this Resolution to 
the Prestdent of the Council of Ninisttrs and the 
Pres1dent of Zi.O.bwe. 
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Motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-1151/82 
tabled by Mr Gerard FUCHS 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the threats of destabilization in Zimbabwe 
The European Parliament, 
ANNEX IV 
A - reaffirming its faith in democracy and in the exercise of civil rights 
in generaL, 
I • 8 - recalling that the Commun1ty welcomed the advent of democracy in Zimb~b~. 
when that country attained independence, 
c -welcoming the objective of a non-racial society established by the 
Zimbabwean authorities and the progress made towards this goal despite 
memories of the war of liberation, 
1. Is alarmed at the increasing threats of destabilization imposed on 
Zimbabwe by the aggressive policy of South Africa; 
2. Denounces the fact that paramilitary forces are being trained by that 
country .n order to create insecurity in Zimbabwe; 
3. Condemns the recent acts of sabotage carried o~· c ' t deira-Mutare 
pipeline by MozambiQue dissidents with Sout~ African backing with the 
aim of increasing Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa; 
4. Requests as a matter of urgency th~t in accordance with the resolution 
adopted by the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly in Rome <November 1982>, 
sanctions be envisaged against South Africa in order to induce it to 
cease sur.h activities; 
5. Inst~ucts its President to forward this resolution to the President o~ 
the Council of Ministers and to the authorities in Pretoria. 
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OPINION 
of the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
Draftsman: Mr G. BERSANI 
On 19 October 1983 the Committee on Development and Cooperation appointed 
Mr Bersani draftsman. 
The Committee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 26 January 
1984 and 2 February 1984. On 2 February 1984 it adopted it with two abstentions. 
Present at the time of the vote: Mr Bersani, Vice-Chairman, acting Chairman, 
draftsman; Mrs Carrettoni-Romagnoli; Mr Cohen; Mr de Courcy Ling; Mr Deschamps 
<deputising for Mr Narudcci>; Mrs Dury; Mr Enright; Mr Ferrero: Mr Howell 
(deputising for Mr Pearce>; Mr Irme~ Mr Jackson, ~; Mr Lezzi; Mr Lomas (deputising 
for Mr Fellermaier>; Mr Taylor, J.D.(deputising for Dr. Sherlock>; Mr Vankerkhoven; 
Mr Wawrzik; Mr Wedekind. 
The opinion was tabled in its final form on 6 February 1984. 
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A 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution1 tabled by Mr Gerard FUCHS 
pursuant to rule 47 of the rules of procedure on the threats of destabilisation 
in Zimbabwe, 
-having regard to the Community's special links with Zimbabwe through the Convention 
of Lome, 
- having regard to its opinion2 adopted on 22 September 1982 on Southern Africa, 
- having regard to the reports 3 of the first two stages of the fact-finding mission 
in the countries affected by the consequences of South African acts of aggression, 
1. Pays tribute to the remarkable degree of stability that has been achieved by 
Zimbabwe since ~ndependence following 15 years of armed conflict; 
2. Points out that Zimbabwe's geographical position makes it particularly vulnerable 
as 
it is a front-line state having a common frontier with the Republic of South 
Africa, 
it has in the past had very close economic links with South Africa, the dominant 
economic force in Southern Africa, 
- it is a landlocked country still highly dependent on South African railways and 
road links for its external trade; 
3. Is convinced that a sound economy constitutes the best basis for political 
stability, and notes the economic difficulties at present facing Zimbabwe due 
1n great part to the world economic recession and the prolonged drought; 
4. Is aware of the potential for instability resulting from the existance of 
important ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe; 
5. Believes that a peaceful and stable Zimbabwe can only be built on the basis of 
mutual respect for all the ethnic groups comprising the population, in a spirit 
of political tolerance and respect for human rights; 
6. Condemns t~e manner in which the Republic of South Africa has attempted to 
destabilise Zimbabwe, in particular by providing support for dissident gtoups 
within that country and its neighbouring states; 
Doc.1-1151/82 
2
oraftsman Mr Lezzi, Doc.1-657/82, page 79 
3
cA/CP/270 and CA/CP/184 
- 38 - rt o6.470/fin. 
7. Regrets the denial of human rights by the imprisonment of the former 
Prime Minister, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, without any charge being 
preferred; 
8. Calls on the European Community to give active support to Zimbabwe, through 
!h~ ~~;6 Convention, notably in relation to 
- transport infrastructure 
- industrial cooperation 
- veterinary health 
- education and technical training; 
9. Feels that the Community should provide Zimbabwe with special assistance to 
combat the effects of the severe drought which is having serious economic and 
social consequences, thereby contributing to the potential for instability; 
10. Stresses the importance of Zimbabwe's exports of tobacco and sugar to the 
Community, and insists that no st~ps be taken to reduce the volume of this trade; 
hopes that the agreed quota of Zimbabwe beef can soon be exported to Europe; 
11 . Calls for an increased level of cooperation with the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which can help the independent 
states of Southern Africa to reduce their dependence on South Africa; this 
should include financial and technical assistance in the following secto~s: 
- transport and communications infrastructure 
- the preparation of joint food strategies 
- indu::>trial development 
- mining and energy 
- education and trainin~. 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. At its sitting of 7 February 1983 the European Parliament referred the 
motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Gerard FUCHS, pursuant to Rule 47 of the 
rules of procedure, on the threats of destabilisation in Zimbabwe <Doc. 1-
·:151/82) to the Committee on Development and Cooperation for its opinion. 
2. Your draftsman has visited Zimbabwe on two occasions, in 1981 and 1982, 
as co-chairman of the fact-finding mission to the countries affected by South 
African acts of aggression, and also with the ACP-EEC Joint Committee in 
February 1982. During these visits he had meetings with the Prime Minister, 
and members of the government, and senior Zimbabian officials, at which issues 
relating to the subject of the present opinion were discussed. 
3. Your draftsman would like to pay tribute to the remarkable degree of 
stability which has been achieved by the government of Zimbabwe following the 
Long period of fighting which terminated with the Lancaster House agreement. 
Zimbabwe has close historical and economic Links with the European Community, 
and notably with the United Kingdom, and it is gratifying to note that one of 
its first acts as an independent country was to apply for accession to the Lome 
Convention. 
4. This opinion will attempt briefly to examine the potentially destabilising 
factors affecting Zimbabwe and the means by which the European Community can 
assist the stability of this country. 
II. INTERNAL FACTORS 
5. A potential factor for destabilisation exists in the ethnic breakdown of 
Zimbabwe's population which consists of some 5.8 million Shona, 1.5 million 
Ndebele, 140,000 Europeans and 37,000 Asian and coloured. During the last 
years of the Smith regime, when fighting was at its fiercest, Mr Robert MUGABE's 
ZANU-PF 1 was predominently supported by the Shona people, while the minority 
Ndebele supported Mr Joshua NKOMO's ZAPU2• This differentiation has continued 
in the post independence period even though both ZANU-PF and ZAPU are represented 
in the government. 
1
zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front 
~~imbabwe African People's Union - 40 - PE 86.4701 fin. 
III. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
14. Zimbabwe is in the most literal sense of the word a front-line state. 
Across the Limpopo river lies the Republic of South Africa which, apart from the 
specific case of Namibia, constitutes the last white minority-governed state on 
the African continent. Though Zimbabwe has had no diplomatic relations with South 
Africa since September 1980, economic and commercial links are important and each 
country has maintained a trade mission in the other. Relations between the two 
countries are not good, and in August 1981 South Africa refused to renew work 
permits for several thousand black Zimbabweans who work in that country. 
15. It is obvious that many in South Africa would not like to see the development 
of a strong and independent state on its northern border. The 
Pretoria government is, moreover, particularly hostile to Prime Minister MUGABE 
who has declared his political and diplomatic support for the liberation 
movements in South Africa and Namibia even though he was not willing to permit 
SWAPO or the ANC to set up operational bases in Zimbabwe. There is 
evidence of South African involvement in activities to destabilise Zimbabwe. 
In 1982 the Beira-Mutare pipeline was sabotaged by Mozambique dissidents with 
South African backing. This pipeline acted as a link between Zimbabwe and the 
coast and its sabotage increased Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa. 
In July 1982 nearly two-thirds of Zimbabwe's airforce was destroyed at Gweru 
by guerrillas using South African equipment. South African soldiers have been 
captured in raids and several South African spies have confessed to activities 
within Zimbabwe. Radio-Truth broadcasts daily to Matebeleland in the Ndeb~le 
language from South Africa. This radio station regularly criticises the 
Zimbabwe government and its leadership. It seems that some Ndebele guerrillas 
find refuge in camps in South African territory. 
16. It is certain that its geographical situation leads to a considerable transport 
dependence on South Africa, whose railway system dominates Southern Africa. 
Other railway and road links are less sure. The highly indirect rail link via 
Zambia, Zaire and Angola <the Benguela railway) is no longer regularly operative 
because of the activities of UNITA in Angola. The link via Zambia with Dar-es-
Salaam carries mainly Zambian and Tanzanian traffic and is affected by serious 
over-crowding in the port of Dar-es-Salaam, while the links through Mozambique to 
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Beira and Maputo have been subject to attacks by Mozambique dissidents backed 
by South Africa. Thus Zimbabwe is largely dependent on South Africa's rail 
links, road links and port system. Such dependence leads to a degree of 
economic vulnerability which can be a destabilising factor. 
17. The rapid economic growth which Zimbabwe enjoyed during its first years 
of independence following the removal of sanctions has been replaced by a 
serious depression, inflation at nearly 20%, a high level of external debt and 
a negative growth in real GNP <estimated by the Standard Bank at minus 3% in 
1983). Zimbabwe has been seriously affected by the world economic depression 
and is suffering from the worst drought in 50 years. Rains were negligible 
in 1981-'82 and 1982-'83 and to-date the 1983-'84 rains have still not started. 
18. As a result the agricultural situation is extremely serious and the 
recession has led to greatly increased internal tensions. 
19. Three agricultural products can be exported from Zimbabwe to the European 
Community: tobacco, cattle and sugar. Tobacco is of particular importance as 
almost half of Zimbabwe's tobacco is exported to the European Community and 
is a valuable source of foreign exchange. While there is no quantitative 
quota on Zimbabwe's tobacco exports to the Community, it is possible that, 
in the future, the safeguard clause could be invoked as this tobacco could be 
in competition with European-grown tobacco. Any restriction on Zimbabwe 
tobacco imports into the Community would have serious repercussions on the 
Zimbabwean economy which is dangerously short of foreign exchange. 
20. Under a special protocol to the Lom~ Convention Zimbabwe is entitled to 
sell 8,500 tonnes of beef a year to the Community. Owing to the existence of 
foot and mouth disease in Zimbabwe, however, such imports have been prohibited 
with consequent losses to the Zimbabwean balance of payments. The Community 
at present finances measures, through the EDF, aimed at the creation of foot 
and mouth free zones from which cattle could be exported. 
21. Zimbabwe has an annual quota of 25,000 tonnes of sugar under the Sugar 
Protocol. It is equally important that this be maintained despite the Community's 
overproduction of beet sugar. 
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22. Partly as a result of the emigration of skilled whites the Zimbabwean , 
economy has been seriously affected by lack of trained personnel. This is 
particularly true in the case of skilled ~radesmen and technicians,and inhibits 
economic development. 
23. It is believed that the IMF has imposed stringent terms on the loans 
granted in 1983. In March of this year the first stand-by credit worth SDR 
300 million started, a,Long with SDR 66.1 million compensatory financing 
facility allocation to make up for the 1982 export shortfall. It is probable 
that the IMF terms run counter to the socialist economic policy that the 
Zimbabwe government would like to follow. 
V. ]~E ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
24. The Committee on Development and Cooperation believes that it is incumbent 
on the European Community to do all in its power to assist the development of 
Zimbabwe and to counter any attempts at destabilisation. Of particular importance 
in this regard is support for the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference <SADCC> of which Zimbabwe is an active member. It is of paramount 
importance for Zimbabwe to reduce its dependence on South Africa and SADCC is 
a valuable instrument in this respect. Increased cooperation with SADCC should 
include appropriate technological assistance, as well as finance in the field 
of transport and communications infrastructure, the preparation of collective 
food strategies, industrial development, education and training. 
25. In addition the Community must continue to give economic assistance to 
Zimbabwe through the EDF and through the activities of the EIB. Though the 
subject of a separate report by Mr PEARCE, your draftsman feels that assistance 
should be provided to Zimbabwe to deal with both the immediate and long-term 
consequences of the drought that is so seriously affecting agriculture .• 
Assistance is also required in the development of internal communications 
infrasturcture, veterinary controls, notabl~ with regard to foot and mouth 
disease, and education and training particularly in the technology sectors. 
26. The Committee on Development and Cooperation recognises the importance 
of Zimbabwe's exports to the Community and would oppose any measure taken to 
restrict the imports of tobacco, or any interference with the operation of 'the 
Sugar Protocol. At the same time it hopes that the animal health situation 
can be brought under control so that Zimbabwe can in the near future avail 
of its beef export quota. It is the Committee's view that a sound economy 
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is the best basis for political stability. 
27. At the same time the Community must exercise its political weight in 
international fora in support of Zimbabwe. It must make it abundantly clear 
that it condemns totally any attempts by a third country to destabilise 
Zimbabwe. The Community should support all measures leading to the internal 
stability of Zimbabwe and the improvement of the security situation throughout 
the country with due regard for the rights or m1norities. It is the oelief 
of the Committee on Development and Cooperation that a peaceful and stable 
Zimbabwe can only be built on the basis of mutual respect for all the ethnic groups 
comprising the population, in a spirit of political tolerance and respect for human 
rights. 
28. In conclusion, the Committee on Development and Cooperation calls on the 
Political Affairs Committee when drawing up its report, to take account of the views 
expressed on pages 4 and 5 of this opinion. 
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